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Scholars of pastoralism often refer to changes of pastoral land tenure as
‘encroachment.’ The New Zealand case of pastoral land tenure reform suggests that
this is incorrect for several reasons. First it takes the point of view of the pastoralist,
which introduces unnecessary bias. Second, it assumes that all changes in land
tenure are situations in which the state, or another powerful agent, takes land away
from the less powerful pastoralists. Third, it assumes a single immutable power
relation between the state (or other external actor initiating land tenure reform) and
the pastoralist in which the state is more powerful and is only too happy to exercise
its power whilst expropriating the pastoralists of the land they use. The term
‘encroachment’ implies that there is just one pattern of land tenure change. I
suggest that land tenure reform is a more apt, less biased, descriptor.
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Scholars of pastoralism often refer to changes of pastoral land tenure as ‘encroach-
ment’ (Degang et al. 2010; Salzman 1994; Benjaminsen 2009; Adriansen 1999; Weaver
1996). To encroach is to intrude on someone else’s territory or impinge on someone’s
right to something, such as privacy. In this article, I use the New Zealand case of pastoral
land tenure reform as evidence that ‘encroachment’ is incorrect as a global descriptor for
several reasons. First it takes the point of view of the pastoralist, which introduces unneces-
sary bias. Second, and more grievously, it assumes that all changes in land tenure are situa-
tions in which the state, or another powerful agent, takes land away from the less powerful
pastoralists. This assumes that there can be no land tenure changes in which the state gives
land to the pastoralists. Further, it assumes a single immutable power relation between the
state (or other external actor initiating land tenure reform) and the pastoralist in which the
state is more powerful and is only too happy to exercise its power whilst expropriating the
pastoralists of the land they use.
The term ‘encroachment’ implies that there is just one pattern, or narrative, of land
tenure change. The trouble with such a universalist thesis is that it takes just one
counter-example to deflate it. I contend that modern-day New Zealand is the deflationary
counter-example. I therefore suggest that land tenure reform is a more apt, less biased,
descriptor.2012 Brower; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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Geographically, the ‘high country’ of New Zealand’s South Island comprises the eastern
slope of the Southern Alps, the main divide that forms the backbone of the South Is-
land. From 1856 to 1992, the high country enjoyed a stable mix of land tenure that, to
start, made pastoralism viable in the harshly beautiful landscapes. From 1856 to 1992,
the Crown (later to become the New Zealand (NZ) government) owned 2.4 milliona ha
of South Island high country land. For 150 years and under several successive land acts,
the Crown leased land to runholdersb ‘for pastoral purposes only’ (Land Act 1948 s.51
(1)(d)). Under pastoral leases, runholders’ property rights were strong – 33-year per-
petually renewable terms – but narrow – no subdivision, no golf courses, and no soil
disturbance (Brower 2008).
In 1992, the Minister of Lands and of Conservation embarked on a land tenure re-
form to ‘divvy up’ the high country. Land with value for biodiversity, landscape, or re-
creation could become public conservation land as parks or reserves. And land ‘capable
of economic use’ could be privatised. However if we take prevalence of articles in major
newspapers as an indicator of public awareness,c the general public in New Zealand
knew little of the policy until 2006.Landscape transformation, financial gains, and bargaining skill
On the ground, tenure review in New Zealand has often resulted in land above 1,000 m
altitude becoming public conservation land administered by the Department of Conser-
vation, while productive land along river valleys and lakeshores has been converted to
freehold (in some countries called fee-simple title) and opened to development. This
conversion to freehold (hereinafter privatisation) has allowed for much of the new viti-
culture near the resort town of Queenstown, residential subdivisions along Lakes
Wakatipu and Wanaka, and the ‘for sale’ signs that sprinkle the Central Otago hills
(Brower 2008, Brower et al. 2010, 2011).
The privatisation is also instigating a landscape transformation. Land that had been
in 80 Crown pastoral leases, with an average size of 5,938 ha and where land use was
restricted to extensive sheep grazing, has so far been subdivided into at least 865 par-
cels, of which 550 are smaller than 50 ha. These 865 parcels are now freehold, and
open to development (Swaffield and Brower 2009). To date, 20 % of these parcels have
been sold by at least 28 of the new landowners. Those who have sold some or all of
their new freehold land have grossed NZ$135.7 milliond (Brower et al. 2011).
To put this in context, those 28 new owners who have sold land since privatisation
initially bought freehold title to 101,752 ha from the Crown for NZ$6.9 million. They
have subdivided and/or sold 47,110 ha (46 %) of their new freehold land for $135.7 mil-
lion. Table 1 gives the details. If we consider the ratio between land purchase price (to
buy freehold title from the Crown) to land selling price (to sell freehold land on the
open and global market) as an indicator of financial gains realised by pastoralists, the
results in column 7 (Table 1) suggest the pastoralists have enjoyed financial gain in the
aftermath of land tenure reform. When the results are broken down further, by parcel
on-sold rather than by former leasehold as displayed in Table 1, the financial gains to
the pastoralists are more striking. The ratio of purchase price to on-selling price varies
from 2 to 27,096, with a median value of 992. Thus, pastoralists are selling land
Table 1 Land sales prices: for freehold title to former pastoral lease land, and for



















Dð Þ= Cð Þ
Bð Þ=ðAÞ
Alphaburn 3365 $267,500 193 $10,100,000 1 658
Bendigo 8727 $172,500 625 $4,685,000 13 379
Closeburn 930 $199,889 14 $17,696,000 25 6090
Cone Peak 2181 $350,000 40 $1,650,000 1 257
Eastburn Waitiri 5910 $535,000 1810 $9,700,000 2 59
Glenroy 1973 $400,000 13 $425,400 3 159
Hillend 2659 $336,000 2443 $26,200,000 2 85
Midrun-Lake
McKay
5372 $179,375 1 $492,000 7 11,788
Mt Pisa I & II 4633 $413,000 53 $2,066,000 5 435
Mt Rosa 1388 $155,556 53 $7,521,000 21 1265
Pukaki Downs 3722 $191,000 582 $4,665,000 4 156
Queensberry
Hills
2905 $120,000 179 $7,347,500 20 99
Rhoboro
Downs
4648 $55,000 127 $1,900,000 1 1264
Spotts Creek 3344 $282,600 3306 $2,030,000 1 7
Waiorau 2691 $191,000 4 $785,000 1 2765
Wentworth 3840 $351,111 3441 $5,547,000 14 18
Woodbine 338 $110,000 0.1 $100,000 1 3069
Ardgour 3719 $640,000 229 $1,466,000 6 37
Avalon 1352 $134,000 1341 $2,264,000 1 17
Ben Ohau 4375 $169,500 3695 $6,047,000 9 42
Blackstone Hill 2684 $175,000 1055 $129,000 1 2
Brookdale 1027 $106,000 1030 $2,000,000 1 19
Cairnmuir 4437 $141,000 4082 $5,334,000 13 41
Earnscleugh 16,410 $608,889 15,273 $1,624,000 7 3
Glencreagh-
Camberleigh
922 $310,000 922 $1,751,000 2 6
Halwyn 3713 $124,444 623 $1,397,500 7 67
Mataura Valley 4322 $164,858 4357 $9,000,000 1 54
Omahau
Downs
165 $31,000 6 $1,819,000 8 1697
Totals 101,752 $6,914,222 47,110 $135,741,400 178
aLeasehold includes a lake view or lies within 10 km of Queenstown or Wanaka. bLeasehold neither includes a lake view
nor lies within 10 km of Queenstown or Wanaka.
Adapted from Brower et al. 2011.
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et al. 2011).
Financial gains for pastoralists are not, by themselves, an indication of bad land policy.
Pastoralists’ financial gains after privatisation might properly be explained as a public good,
as higher land prices and productivity generate economic growth and tax revenue. What is
less easy to explain, and what again violates the presumptions of the encroachment
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235,000 ha than the runholders paid the Crown for freehold rights of 290,000 ha.
From 1992 through 2008, the Crown bought pastoral rights to about 235,456 ha, and the
runholders bought titles to about 278,897 ha. In terms of option values and property rights,
the Crown bought the option to graze sheep, or to exclude sheep from, of about 235,000 ha.
The runholders bought the options to subdivide and develop about 290,000 ha beyond its
pastoral uses (Brower et al. 2011). On the face of it, it seems that what the Crown sold –
the option to develop land – would be more valuable than what it bought – the option to
graze the unforgiving, high altitude country deemed incapable of other economic use. Yet
the Crown paid runholders NZ$22,682,991 more for the grazing option than runholders
paid the Crown for the development option (Brower et al. 2010).
Further exploration of the inner workings of land reform negotiations shed light on
the outcomes and the underlying power relations. In each deal, rather than taking an
active stance in land reform negotiations, mid-level bureaucrats directed the govern-
ment contractors making deals to be neutral in negotiations. The trouble is that the
Crown and its taxpayers have a sizeable financial interest in the high country; and the
Crown’s failure to advocate for that interest was a tacit agreement to forfeit its, and the
public’s, rights from the start (Brower 2006, 2008).
More to the point, analysis of individual prices paid revealed that the runholders who
received freehold title to the most land also got the most favourable per hectare price;
that is, those who kept the least land got the worst price per hectare, and those who
kept the most land got the best price per hectare. This means that while privatising
high country land, the Crown was giving a bulk discount – the more land it privatised,
the less it charged per hectare. A bulk discount is a manifestation of an economic de-
mand curve. Thus, the prices agreed to in negotiation closely resemble the runholders’
demand curve for freehold land. In other words, the Crown paid whatever it took to
close land reform deals (Brower et al. 2010). Again, this is inconsistent with the
assumptions of the encroachment narrative.Conclusion
Both the financial gains to pastoralists after privatisation and the pattern of generous
payments to pastoralists during the land tenure reform process point to an underlying
power dynamic that is very different from that suggested by the encroachment narra-
tive. Encroachment implies that the state is more powerful and is readily willing to ex-
ercise that power over the subservient pastoralists. However, it is not so in New
Zealand where pastoralists use skillful bargaining to their financial advantage. Further,
the Crown’s consistent under-valuing of the development options it is selling suggests
that it is pathologically unwilling or politically unable to exercise its power on its side
of the land reform negotiation table. Thus, New Zealand pastoral land reform indeed
appears to debunk the encroachment narrative.Endnotes
aFor comparison, Israel is 2 million ha, and Belgium is about 2.5 million ha.
bIn New Zealand, a ‘runholder’ is a pastoralist who holds a Crown pastoral lease, also
known as a high country farmer, leaseholder, or lessee.
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and 124 articles, editorials, and letters to the editor respectively. On average, that is
6.2 articles/year for The Press (Christchurch) and 9.5 articles/year for the Otago Daily
Times (Dunedin). For reference, in 2005, The Press ran 14 articles in 7 weeks about a
proposed tour for the Black Caps, the national cricket team.
dIn 2012, the NZ dollar hovers around US$0.80.
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